The process of relieving financially-stressed commuter and state transportation departments from their burden of maintaining rail infrastructure would be a 21st century homage to the formation of Amtrak in the late 1960’s and early 1970’s. Amtrak revolutionized passenger train travel in America by creating a single, unified network, that refocused a need for intercity passenger rail, and brought together people who knew how to, and were interested in running passenger trains. It was, however, never given the funding or contracts needed to deliver the fast, frequent service that is required for increasing ridership. In the same way that freight railroads could no longer financially support passenger operations, many public organizations own a large number of rail lines, both active and inactive, that are in need of renewal and investment, for which little or no funding is available. Many commuter and state-owned rail lines have been invested in heavily, and support very prolific rail operations, but there is always room for improvement in service.
Commuter railroads operate at a loss because of the high costs associated with their infrastructure (stations, track, rolling stock), capital improvements, labor costs and access fees they pay to freight railroads for running over private track. Because these railroads are already operating at a loss, and because there is either no additional money available, no interest in committing more money to them, or freight railroads are reluctant to cooperate, there is no ability to increase frequency, speed, or capacity of commuter trains. This ultimately leads to a stagnation of service--service that is very susceptible to interruption--and the net result is that most commuter railroads in America, while capable of greatly reducing highway congestion and air pollution, under-perform in both respects. This is especially true when compared to metro systems that operate in the same geographical area. The practice of running trains with relatively few passengers also provides justification for those that wish to strip funding from under-performing commuter and regional railroads.
Restructuring the way commuter railroads, and Amtrak, are funded would free the railroads from the burdensome, and financially precarious position of funding the maintenance and expansion of both track and stations, train dispatching, train operation, rolling stock maintenance, and administrative oversight of all of these departments. If the majority of commuter railroads budget's were only comprised of train operation, rolling stock leasing/acquisition, and maintenance, commuter train service would become much more efficient and more heavily utilized.
While a case could be made that heavy-rail metro systems in America should be united under a federal infrastructure manager, a stronger case could be made against this happening, at least in the near term. With few exceptions (Washington D.C.), American cities that have heavy-rail rapid transit systems have understood long ago how integral those systems are to the continuation of daily life in that city and have set up appropriate, dedicated funding streams that keep those systems running, expansion not included. For this reason, and the fact that almost all rapid transit systems in this country are completely isolated from each other geographically and operationally, and there is little need (and little possibility) to unify them into a single network; emphasis should be focused on commuter and intercity railroads. By assuming control the low-hanging publicly held fruit-the rail lines in destination urban areas-and then connecting those commuter networks and cities together, America would be well on its way to having a sprawling, open access network that would provide the passenger and freight train capacity needed to meet the demands of population increase and climate change that are the two of the largest problems America faces, for which it is currently unprepared.
Acquiring the Initial Lines
One could only imagine the gold-rush excitement that states and transportation agencies would exhibit if they were given an opportunity to shed their main-line infrastructure obligations. States that have a single, disproportionately large metropolis like New York, Illinois, Massachusetts, Maryland, Colorado, and Utah would likely support relegating their publicly-held rail lines to the federal government, regardless of possible objections from their respective commuter railroads. Other agencies such as Metrolink and NCTD in Los Angeles and San Diego, TRE in Dallas and Fort Worth, and the Florida DOT, which owns the track of both Tri-Rail and Sun Rail in Miami and Orlando, would probably be open to signing over the rail lines they own because they all could benefit from a federal organization assuming financial responsibility their infrastructure. Both SEPTA and New Jersey Transit may initially be wary of relinquishing control of their commuter rail infrastructure to the federal government because they’ve both had struggles with Amtrak in the past. Both organizations, however, have very diverse transportation portfolios and would probably understand the immediate benefits of having more capital to fund their other transit modes.
Once the national rail infrastructure manager became established, with a core of rail lines that are currently publicly held, emphasis should be placed on creating a true network. Of the seven class 1 freight railroads that currently operate in the United States, most would certainly be opposed to the federal government assuming control of their private infrastructure, but that doesn’t mean they couldn’t benefit from open access. Initially, because of the integral link between freight and passenger transportation to the American economy, the dire need to seriously reduce America’s pollution of green-house gases, and the simple fact that interstate highway capacity expansion in dense urban environments is no longer a plausible solution to increased congestion, a strong case could be made for the federal government assuming the majority of rail lines that exist in large urban centers.
When Railroads Make the News
Railroads, particularly freight roads, rarely garner national attention, except when service is interrupted. The main reason for this is because most people only come to understand a railroad’s true importance when the service, which usually seems mundane, is disrupted in an often dramatic way. The effects of one derailment or storm can be felt across the country, because America has an extensive, albeit fragmented, rail network.
In January of 2014, Chicago was hit by a massive blizzard, that was exacerbated by extreme cold, and it decimated the national railway network. Shipments of all goods and thousands of passenger trains were delayed for prolonged periods, because the railroads were ill prepared for such a storm. Traffic didn’t start flowing through Chicago at a rate similar to before the storm hit for weeks afterward. The result was that freight shipments were extremely late across the whole of North America, and it took over a year for the system to recover. Power plants were reduced in some cases to less than a two-week supply of coal, down from their normal 3 to 6 month stock. Farmers were delayed in planting their crops because they did not have the fertilizer they needed, and their harvests were delayed in being delivered. The increased traffic from the recent crude-by-rail boom added to the extreme congestion, as the railroads prioritized the shipments of more lucrative hazardous materials, and this resulted in Amtrak having one of it’s worst on-time-performance years of all time.
Arguing that because allowing investment-wary private railroads to control a large portion of the American economy, through transportation of goods, leaves the country extremely vulnerable to another disaster like the one that unfolded in 2014, is not fallacious. By controlling their own infrastructure, private railroads have complete power to prioritize specific trains, particularly when service interruptions occur. This often results in the most lucrative shipments taking precedence over all other trains, in a way that most would find unacceptable in highway traffic. The majority of problems moving trains arose from the fact that there are thousands of yard and main track switches that were not equipped with mechanical switch heaters. When one train needs to potentially negotiate 5 to 10 switches or more just to clear a main track, and each switch can take 10-20 minutes or longer to clean out, delays compound, train crews run out of time to work, and the system breaks down very rapidly. Surely, after running trains over the same rights-of-way for in some cases over 160 years, the issue of moving trains from one track to another in the middle of one of Chicago’s notorious winters would be resolved, but 2014 demonstrated that it indeed was not.
The issue of crew unfamiliarity with the hundreds of railroad subdivisions, yards, and interchange points that make up the Chicago rail network add to the congestion that plagues Chicago even when the system is functioning properly. While these issues are certainly not unique to Chicago, the majority of this problem arises from the total lack of standardized practices of operating and constructing both railroad subdivisions and rail yards. This also arises from the railroad’s and the FRA’s disinterest in spending the money to develop a single standardized code of operating rules for conventional heavy-rail railroads that should be expected after existing for more than a century and a half. The lack of uniform criteria for how railroad yards are laid out also creates much confusion for train crews when they’re unfamiliar with the various local, and often arbitrary, rail terminals’ layout and operating instructions. For numerous reasons, crew training has been reduced to rudimentary knowledge of skills and territory qualification. Railroads desire crews to be capable of operating over very diverse operating conditions and locales while giving very minimal training.
While a case could be made that heavy-rail metro systems in America should be united under a federal infrastructure manager, a stronger case could be made against this happening, at least in the near term. With few exceptions (Washington D.C.), American cities that have heavy-rail rapid transit systems have understood long ago how integral those systems are to the continuation of daily life in that city and have set up appropriate, dedicated funding streams that keep those systems running, expansion not included. For this reason, and the fact that almost all rapid transit systems in this country are completely isolated from each other geographically and operationally, and there is little need (and little possibility) to unify them into a single network; emphasis should be focused on commuter and intercity railroads. By assuming control the low-hanging publicly held fruit-the rail lines in destination urban areas-and then connecting those commuter networks and cities together, America would be well on its way to having a sprawling, open access network that would provide the passenger and freight train capacity needed to meet the demands of population increase and climate change that are the two of the largest problems America faces, for which it is currently unprepared.
Acquiring the Initial Lines
One could only imagine the gold-rush excitement that states and transportation agencies would exhibit if they were given an opportunity to shed their main-line infrastructure obligations. States that have a single, disproportionately large metropolis like New York, Illinois, Massachusetts, Maryland, Colorado, and Utah would likely support relegating their publicly-held rail lines to the federal government, regardless of possible objections from their respective commuter railroads. Other agencies such as Metrolink and NCTD in Los Angeles and San Diego, TRE in Dallas and Fort Worth, and the Florida DOT, which owns the track of both Tri-Rail and Sun Rail in Miami and Orlando, would probably be open to signing over the rail lines they own because they all could benefit from a federal organization assuming financial responsibility their infrastructure. Both SEPTA and New Jersey Transit may initially be wary of relinquishing control of their commuter rail infrastructure to the federal government because they’ve both had struggles with Amtrak in the past. Both organizations, however, have very diverse transportation portfolios and would probably understand the immediate benefits of having more capital to fund their other transit modes.
Once the national rail infrastructure manager became established, with a core of rail lines that are currently publicly held, emphasis should be placed on creating a true network. Of the seven class 1 freight railroads that currently operate in the United States, most would certainly be opposed to the federal government assuming control of their private infrastructure, but that doesn’t mean they couldn’t benefit from open access. Initially, because of the integral link between freight and passenger transportation to the American economy, the dire need to seriously reduce America’s pollution of green-house gases, and the simple fact that interstate highway capacity expansion in dense urban environments is no longer a plausible solution to increased congestion, a strong case could be made for the federal government assuming the majority of rail lines that exist in large urban centers.
When Railroads Make the News
Railroads, particularly freight roads, rarely garner national attention, except when service is interrupted. The main reason for this is because most people only come to understand a railroad’s true importance when the service, which usually seems mundane, is disrupted in an often dramatic way. The effects of one derailment or storm can be felt across the country, because America has an extensive, albeit fragmented, rail network.
In January of 2014, Chicago was hit by a massive blizzard, that was exacerbated by extreme cold, and it decimated the national railway network. Shipments of all goods and thousands of passenger trains were delayed for prolonged periods, because the railroads were ill prepared for such a storm. Traffic didn’t start flowing through Chicago at a rate similar to before the storm hit for weeks afterward. The result was that freight shipments were extremely late across the whole of North America, and it took over a year for the system to recover. Power plants were reduced in some cases to less than a two-week supply of coal, down from their normal 3 to 6 month stock. Farmers were delayed in planting their crops because they did not have the fertilizer they needed, and their harvests were delayed in being delivered. The increased traffic from the recent crude-by-rail boom added to the extreme congestion, as the railroads prioritized the shipments of more lucrative hazardous materials, and this resulted in Amtrak having one of it’s worst on-time-performance years of all time.
Arguing that because allowing investment-wary private railroads to control a large portion of the American economy, through transportation of goods, leaves the country extremely vulnerable to another disaster like the one that unfolded in 2014, is not fallacious. By controlling their own infrastructure, private railroads have complete power to prioritize specific trains, particularly when service interruptions occur. This often results in the most lucrative shipments taking precedence over all other trains, in a way that most would find unacceptable in highway traffic. The majority of problems moving trains arose from the fact that there are thousands of yard and main track switches that were not equipped with mechanical switch heaters. When one train needs to potentially negotiate 5 to 10 switches or more just to clear a main track, and each switch can take 10-20 minutes or longer to clean out, delays compound, train crews run out of time to work, and the system breaks down very rapidly. Surely, after running trains over the same rights-of-way for in some cases over 160 years, the issue of moving trains from one track to another in the middle of one of Chicago’s notorious winters would be resolved, but 2014 demonstrated that it indeed was not.
The issue of crew unfamiliarity with the hundreds of railroad subdivisions, yards, and interchange points that make up the Chicago rail network add to the congestion that plagues Chicago even when the system is functioning properly. While these issues are certainly not unique to Chicago, the majority of this problem arises from the total lack of standardized practices of operating and constructing both railroad subdivisions and rail yards. This also arises from the railroad’s and the FRA’s disinterest in spending the money to develop a single standardized code of operating rules for conventional heavy-rail railroads that should be expected after existing for more than a century and a half. The lack of uniform criteria for how railroad yards are laid out also creates much confusion for train crews when they’re unfamiliar with the various local, and often arbitrary, rail terminals’ layout and operating instructions. For numerous reasons, crew training has been reduced to rudimentary knowledge of skills and territory qualification. Railroads desire crews to be capable of operating over very diverse operating conditions and locales while giving very minimal training.
Were railroads relieved of maintaining their main-line infrastructure in dense urban areas around the country, they could focus on competing more aggressively for customers’ business, and less on reducing track maintenance costs, lowering operating ratios, and charging customers redundant fees for interchanging traffic with another carrier. Were there a single organization in charge of maintaining track and access, they could also manage crew training for operating over that track. Along with a lack of standardization of most operating practices among railroads, there exists a lack of standardized training. Creating uniformity among railroad subdivisions and yards would be similar to the uniformity of air traffic control and airports across the globe. Were pilots required to memorize arcane and antiquated operating practices for every state and airport, there were be far more delays and catastrophes in commercial aviation, because it's simply an impractical way of managing vehicular traffic.
The 2014 storm brought a renewed focus on Chicago’s CREATE program, but this did not manifest in increased funding. Some individual railroads are still reluctant to invest in the grade separation and capacity improvement projects that would prevent future catastrophes like January of 2014, and all the operators in Chicago expect the federal government to fund the majority of the projects. The problem is that federal money for rail infrastructure investments is scarce, and Chicago is by no means the only city where these issues exist; it simply has the most railroads and traffic flowing through it. Additionally, public money being spent on private infrastructure, which is being maintained (or not) by companies that value profit over efficient train operation is not the best strategy for increasing passenger rail ridership in this country. For this reason, public ownership of vital rail infrastructure is the only viable solution to solving America’s problems which extend far beyond the rail network today.
Natural disasters are able to inflict great damage anywhere in the country, and no railroad is immune to them; how a railroad is prepared to recover after a natural disaster, however, is something they can control. Superstorm Sandy and the nor’easter that struck in January of 2015 showed the nation that not only are passenger railroads incredibly important in large cities, but they are also not prepared to handle the destruction brought about by storms which were once considered to be anomalies (but are rapidly becoming the norm with the advent of global climate change). Freight traffic was not affected nearly as bad in the blizzard, as it was in Chicago a year prior, but passenger trains, particularly in Boston, fared far worse. The one bright spot of this disaster was MBTA realizing a major economic benefit of subcontracting when they fined their private operator, Keolis, $7.53 million for penalties incurred from delayed and cancelled trains, due to the storm. This example demonstrates how providing decent service can be incentivised through divestment of operations, which were traditionally managed by a single organization. While MBTA eventually opted to allow Keolis to reinvest that fine into their company (hoping that this would lead to improved rail services), having the ability to collect penalties from either operators or infrastructure managers for service disruptions are two very effective by-products of a liberalised, open access network.
Connecting the DOTs
If there was enough support to take a more aggressive approach towards publicly acquiring rail lines in America, the benefits of an open access network would be realized sooner than the incremental approach to improving rail service that is currently being executed. If America were to experience an economic recession that was worse than the Great Recession, or even a depression, the support needed to create such a network might manifest itself both in the federal government, and the American people. Rail networks in other countries were nationalized in response to such economic hardships, but in America’s current political climate, (re)nationalization would not be the most beneficial solution to the many problems the industry faces. Greater efficiency and proliferation of service would more likely be realized from an open access network that promoted competition among operators.
The 2014 storm brought a renewed focus on Chicago’s CREATE program, but this did not manifest in increased funding. Some individual railroads are still reluctant to invest in the grade separation and capacity improvement projects that would prevent future catastrophes like January of 2014, and all the operators in Chicago expect the federal government to fund the majority of the projects. The problem is that federal money for rail infrastructure investments is scarce, and Chicago is by no means the only city where these issues exist; it simply has the most railroads and traffic flowing through it. Additionally, public money being spent on private infrastructure, which is being maintained (or not) by companies that value profit over efficient train operation is not the best strategy for increasing passenger rail ridership in this country. For this reason, public ownership of vital rail infrastructure is the only viable solution to solving America’s problems which extend far beyond the rail network today.
Natural disasters are able to inflict great damage anywhere in the country, and no railroad is immune to them; how a railroad is prepared to recover after a natural disaster, however, is something they can control. Superstorm Sandy and the nor’easter that struck in January of 2015 showed the nation that not only are passenger railroads incredibly important in large cities, but they are also not prepared to handle the destruction brought about by storms which were once considered to be anomalies (but are rapidly becoming the norm with the advent of global climate change). Freight traffic was not affected nearly as bad in the blizzard, as it was in Chicago a year prior, but passenger trains, particularly in Boston, fared far worse. The one bright spot of this disaster was MBTA realizing a major economic benefit of subcontracting when they fined their private operator, Keolis, $7.53 million for penalties incurred from delayed and cancelled trains, due to the storm. This example demonstrates how providing decent service can be incentivised through divestment of operations, which were traditionally managed by a single organization. While MBTA eventually opted to allow Keolis to reinvest that fine into their company (hoping that this would lead to improved rail services), having the ability to collect penalties from either operators or infrastructure managers for service disruptions are two very effective by-products of a liberalised, open access network.
Connecting the DOTs
If there was enough support to take a more aggressive approach towards publicly acquiring rail lines in America, the benefits of an open access network would be realized sooner than the incremental approach to improving rail service that is currently being executed. If America were to experience an economic recession that was worse than the Great Recession, or even a depression, the support needed to create such a network might manifest itself both in the federal government, and the American people. Rail networks in other countries were nationalized in response to such economic hardships, but in America’s current political climate, (re)nationalization would not be the most beneficial solution to the many problems the industry faces. Greater efficiency and proliferation of service would more likely be realized from an open access network that promoted competition among operators.
For the same reason that the interstate highway system was created using the rationale that it was important for national defense, a national rail network can also be viewed in that light. The nationalization of America’s railroads in World War I notwithstanding, the nation’s safety in time of war should not be reliant on private railroads moving goods and passengers slowly and inefficiently. Neither should the American economy fall victim to the same flaws of the rail network in times of peace. From a defense standpoint, the American government having the ability to run trains hauling military supplies and equipment, raw materials, energy products, and food without having to wait for private railroads that haul competing shipments, at a painfully slow pace, would be very beneficial indeed.
A second strong argument for the national takeover of private rail infrastructure is that American railroads are currently facing a substantial change in the amount and type of freight they haul, which is having a large impact on rail traffic across the country. Electricity producers throughout America are opting to switch from railroad-hauled coal to pipeline-supplied natural gas, which has decreased carload traffic as much as 60% in some cases, in the past few years. This change is occurring at such a rapid pace for many reasons, but it has certainly been a long time coming. The failure of American railroads to recognize this problem and generate new traffic before the major slump in coal shipments hit, has proved to be a very costly mistake. Some railroads were looking to crude oil to fill the gap that the loss in coal traffic was going to make, but a combination of horrific derailments, tightening regulation in response to those derailments, increased regulation of hydraulic fracturing, and the drop in crude oil prices has almost sealed the fate for railroads regaining revenue lost from coal, through shipping oil.
What is bad news for private railroads, however, can be good news for the American people. The decrease in freight traffic has provided a large increase in track capacity, particularly on routes that were formerly dominated by coal. If another deep recession were to come about, even more capacity would created across the freight network. This would open the door for, at a minimum, Amtrak negotiating increased frequencies of their current long-distance services, and at best, the federal government taking over under-used lines. Freight railroads have already begun moth-balling rail subdivisions and terminals due to the drop-off in coal traffic. If another economic downturn were to hurt rail traffic, railroads may consider reducing capacity on, or even abandoning rights-of-way. If railroads decided to again turn to the incredibly short-sighted process of selling infrastructure (rail and bridges) for scrap, this would be a terrible blow for future passenger rail service in America. For this reason, there is indeed an additional sense of urgency for the Federal government to get serious about passenger rail in America. BNSF signaled how the process of public acquisition could begin when they arguably “blackmailed” the states of New Mexico, Colorado, and Kansas into paying them to keep Amtrak’s Southwest Chief operating over the Raton Pass. While BNSF retains ownership of the line, it’s really not theirs to keep when they are paid by taxpayers to maintain, dispatch, and inspect the line (while retaining the right to run freight on the line whenever they desire). The same way that most railroads in this country were built using some form of public money, and all railroads have received some sort of public funding for improvements, the mainline infrastructure that private railroads control is not really theirs to own. Realigning public ownership with the realities of how railroads were built, improved, and maintained, would itself lead to the creation of a national, open-access, rail network.
The final argument for developing a public rail network is the need to increase efficiency and capacity of important rail corridors. When freight train routing is determined by either one or two railroad's trackage, often the shortest, most efficient route is not selected. For example, if a grain elevator in South Dakota, sold a train-load of wheat to a food producer in California’s central valley, that shipment would travel south on the BNSF to Kansas City, where it would follow the former Santa Fe mainline to Barstow, CA, then turn north to its destination, over the Tehachapi mountains. Hundreds of extra miles are added to this train’s trip, because the UP doesn’t service the elevator in South Dakota-or the customer in California-and the BNSF charged the customer less to ship it hundreds of extra miles on its circuitous route than they would charge to deliver the train to the UP in Sioux City, IA, and receive it again in Stockton, CA. With open access, the shortest, most efficient route would be utilized, and both railroads could compete equally for the business. Captive shippers, the grain elevator in this scenario, would no longer be beholden to a single, price-gouging railroad.
As well as more efficiently operating freight trains, long distance and regional passenger trains could be operated at high frequency, and at higher speeds than most passenger trains are today; both of which are necessary to increase ridership. Germany runs more freight trains than most other European countries, but they also have a prolific high speed rail network. Many high speed trains traverse conventional rail lines where freight trains simultaneously operate, and there’s no reason why this scenario couldn’t exit in America. Well maintained freight corridors that currently support freight train speeds of 70 MPH could be upgraded to run passenger trains at 110 mph, with relatively little investment. Cities and states that have these corridors running through them could initiate passenger service for much less than it costs today. Were Amtrak appropriately funded and allowed to replace and expand their rolling stock fleet, the cost of intercity passenger train equipment would drop, further reducing initial startup cost for new services.
The end goal for rail transportation in America should be much more than incrementally upgrading our current rail infrastructure, but this is certainly a first step towards reaching a brighter future. Conventional rail lines will continue to be an important part of America’s passenger network as long as conventional trains continue to operate. The Northeast Corridor will forever be an intercity and commuter rail artery, and its operational performance will continue to be improved. It will be many decades before the California High Speed Rail Authority will be able to construct a new high speed line along the San Francisco peninsula, but that doesn’t mean the CAHSR network isn’t vitally important to California’s future. Alas, the majority of the American rail network should be viewed in a similar light: as an incredibly valuable national resource that should be invested in with the same fervor as America’s roads and airports. There are many corridors that could be improved to support passenger train speeds of 150 MPH or more, the way the Northeast Corridor has. While this may not lead to an incredibly large market for travelers going from New York City to Los Angeles via train, there would indeed be a very large market for travellers going to any number of the thousands of destinations you could reach between those two cities, if that trip took less time that it currently takes to travel from New York City to Chicago.
The final argument for developing a public rail network is the need to increase efficiency and capacity of important rail corridors. When freight train routing is determined by either one or two railroad's trackage, often the shortest, most efficient route is not selected. For example, if a grain elevator in South Dakota, sold a train-load of wheat to a food producer in California’s central valley, that shipment would travel south on the BNSF to Kansas City, where it would follow the former Santa Fe mainline to Barstow, CA, then turn north to its destination, over the Tehachapi mountains. Hundreds of extra miles are added to this train’s trip, because the UP doesn’t service the elevator in South Dakota-or the customer in California-and the BNSF charged the customer less to ship it hundreds of extra miles on its circuitous route than they would charge to deliver the train to the UP in Sioux City, IA, and receive it again in Stockton, CA. With open access, the shortest, most efficient route would be utilized, and both railroads could compete equally for the business. Captive shippers, the grain elevator in this scenario, would no longer be beholden to a single, price-gouging railroad.
As well as more efficiently operating freight trains, long distance and regional passenger trains could be operated at high frequency, and at higher speeds than most passenger trains are today; both of which are necessary to increase ridership. Germany runs more freight trains than most other European countries, but they also have a prolific high speed rail network. Many high speed trains traverse conventional rail lines where freight trains simultaneously operate, and there’s no reason why this scenario couldn’t exit in America. Well maintained freight corridors that currently support freight train speeds of 70 MPH could be upgraded to run passenger trains at 110 mph, with relatively little investment. Cities and states that have these corridors running through them could initiate passenger service for much less than it costs today. Were Amtrak appropriately funded and allowed to replace and expand their rolling stock fleet, the cost of intercity passenger train equipment would drop, further reducing initial startup cost for new services.
The end goal for rail transportation in America should be much more than incrementally upgrading our current rail infrastructure, but this is certainly a first step towards reaching a brighter future. Conventional rail lines will continue to be an important part of America’s passenger network as long as conventional trains continue to operate. The Northeast Corridor will forever be an intercity and commuter rail artery, and its operational performance will continue to be improved. It will be many decades before the California High Speed Rail Authority will be able to construct a new high speed line along the San Francisco peninsula, but that doesn’t mean the CAHSR network isn’t vitally important to California’s future. Alas, the majority of the American rail network should be viewed in a similar light: as an incredibly valuable national resource that should be invested in with the same fervor as America’s roads and airports. There are many corridors that could be improved to support passenger train speeds of 150 MPH or more, the way the Northeast Corridor has. While this may not lead to an incredibly large market for travelers going from New York City to Los Angeles via train, there would indeed be a very large market for travellers going to any number of the thousands of destinations you could reach between those two cities, if that trip took less time that it currently takes to travel from New York City to Chicago.